Amidst the ongoing war in Gaza, in March three European countries launched an urgent international campaign to recognize "Palestine" as a state. Spain, Ireland, and Norway claim that this preemptive act of diplomacy will help settle the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There followed a UN General Assembly vote that urged the UN Security Council to give "Palestine" full UN membership, a political upgrade tantamount to recognition of statehood - and an announcement by Spain, Ireland, and Norway that they will recognize a Palestinian state as of May 28th.
Any proposal to quell the hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians deserves serious attention. However, the European and UN schemes of recognition will have the opposite of the desired effect by undermining the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which was designed to produce a Palestinian state through mutual compromise, not a preemptive win for one side. The better approach is to encourage more negotiation, not less.
Calling Palestine a state does not make it a state. In 1988, when the Palestinians declared independence, most nations gave the alleged state recognition. But the pronouncements had no effect because Palestine remained legally unqualified for statehood, as explained further below. On April 18 of this year, the US vetoed the latest UN Security Council resolution to admit Palestine as a full member. While the standoff looked to some like a U.S. denial of Palestinian statehood, the simple fact is that the UN lacks the power to grant sovereignty.
When existing states recognize a new state, the gestures may reinforce a legal accession to statehood. But as cautioned by the renowned legal authority, Professor James Crawford, "[a]n entity is not a state because it's recognized; it's recognized because it is a state."1
Giving Palestinians the appearance of statehood will only discourage them from negotiating with Israel to attain real statehood. The framework for that bargaining was painstakingly assembled in the 1990's, when a set of contracts called the Oslo Accords was signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, acting as representative of the Palestinian people. Although the Oslo dialog has been stalled for years, it has brought the adversaries to an interim stage of agreement. The Accords require bilateral negotiation without recourse to third-party pressure tactics. If the Palestinians renege on that promise by treating third-party nods of recognition as a license for sovereignty, they could well be regarded as having effectively rescinded the Accords.
Erasing the gains of Oslo would damage both signatories. The Palestinian Authority (PA) would squander its Oslo-based opportunity to found a state, and Palestinians could lose their right of autonomy in Gaza and the major Palestinian population centers of the West Bank. Israel, for its part, could no longer have the benefit of Palestinian security cooperation in the West Bank, and bilateral coordination might cease on infrastructure matters such as water and electricity.
Abandoning the Oslo Accords would also dash hopes to resolve the contractually slated "permanent status issues:" borders, Jerusalem, settlements, security, and refugees. With no incentive to negotiate the terms of its desired statehood, Palestinians would be tempted to moot the above issues by relying on international pressure on Israel and by force of arms. For example, they could sign mutual defense pacts with existing states and enlist them to help conquer the West Bank and Jerusalem. No doubt Israel would invoke its right of self-defense to counter the aggression. Potentially, the war could spread further. After all, the Oslo Accords notwithstanding, the Palestinian National Charter pledges to destroy all of Israel.2
Even if the proposed multilateral recognition does no legal harm, Palestinians may view the collective vote of sympathy as a political reward for the October 7 terrorist invasion that ignited the current war. Indeed, Hamas militants would probably bask in the misguided glory. The reward of state recognition in the wake of that horrific assault could well inspire more terrorism. By contrast, if the Palestinians would return to the bargaining table in a spirit of cooperation, working towards the goal of two states for two peoples living side-by-side in peace and security, Israel could help them earn statehood lawfully.
The requirements to become a state are listed in the Montevideo Convention.3 Specifically, the candidate organization must obtain a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and a capacity to maintain relations with other states. Israel could facilitate each of these tasks.
Pre-state Palestine lacks a permanent population. In fact, their numbers could double if the millions of Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere relocate to the desired state. Israel could accommodate such a transition within the context of a fair peace deal. Likewise, the territory of pre-Palestine will remain undefined until the adversaries decide where to draw their shared borders. Hamas and the PA now compete as rivals, but Israel could help empower a single effective Palestinian government. Finally, although the Oslo Accords currently prohibit Palestinians from engaging in foreign affairs,4 Israel could agree to modify that restriction as part of a final accord.
In sum, third-party recognition of a Palestinian state will not solve the problems that fuel the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nor will it bestow upon "Palestine" the attributes of a state that it still lacks. There is no short cut around the need for Israel and the Palestinians come to terms with each other. Only then will the conflict end.
1 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2nd ed. 2006), p. 93.
2 See Palestinian National Charter Articles 2 ("Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit"); 9 ("Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine"); and 10 ("Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war").
3 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).
4 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Sept. 28, 1995), Art IX, Section 5.a.
